As I write this column, Iran has fired on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. retaliated by striking military sites in Iran and revoked the Iran oil sanctions waiver. We were told by the administration that the peace talks were progressing and the war is either over or is nearly over. So why are we seeing resumptions of hostilities and an apparent lack of progress in reaching a peace settlement?
To answer that question, I refer you to a book published in 1981 entitled “Getting to Yes,” by Bruce Patton, Roger Fisher and William Ury. The authors were Harvard professors who designed the negotiating process for the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978.
In the late 1980s, I was a young partner in a Big 4 accounting firm. At that time, we experienced clients’ increased fee sensitivity and fee negotiations were getting much tougher. In response, the firm hired the authors of “Getting to Yes,” to teach us how to better negotiate fees.
Both the book and the course were marvelous. I highly recommend the book, which is available online. The book contains many valuable negotiation insights, but the one that has stuck with me is the concept of BATNA — Best Alternatives To Negotiated Agreements.
The best way to explain the BATNA concept is that, during negotiation, each party has alternatives other than a negotiated settlement and neither party is going to enter into a negotiated agreement that puts them in a position worse than those alternatives.
When trying to understand the other party’s BATNA, you need to view the situation from their perspective rather than from your own perspective. This is especially important when there are significant cultural differences between the two parties.
Viewing the situation from an Iranian perspective, what is their BATNA to a peace agreement? The answer is multifaceted, but if they do not enter into a peace agreement, the hardline Iranian leadership likely perceives that the following opportunities exist to force the U.S. into agreeing to more favorable terms:
• Weaponize the Strait of Hormuz.
• Resume attacking US Gulf allies in an attempt to inflict severe economic pain.
• Accelerate Iranian nuclear capabilities. Once Iran has achieved those capabilities, they can be used as a deterrent against interference by the U.S. and other nations.
• Offer oil and unrestricted shipping to so-called neutral nations such as China. (China has already clandestinely helped Iran.)
The Iranian leadership does not care abut the economic carnage it inflicts on the Iranian people and they probably believe that, if they inflict duress on the global economy, the U.S. will make concessions before Iran does.
It does not matter how realistic the Iranian perceptions are — their perceptions control their negotiation strategy.
So, what is America’s BATNA?
In the absence of a negotiated agreement, the U.S. could do the following:
• Reinstate the naval blockade and targeted bombing campaign, which may also require the use of ground troops to seize Iranian assets and possibly even retrieve Iranian nuclear materials.
• Use its financial prowess to shut down the Iranian economy and cut off $300 billion of funds needed to reconstruct facilities that were destroyed by the earlier bombing campaign.
• Use the Navy to police the Strait of Hormuz to restore historic shipping levels
• Provide better defense systems to Gulf allies who could be subject to future Iranian attacks.
If the U.S. implements its BATNA, it will likely do so at great cost. Not only will it be expensive in terms of dollars and lives, but it also will result in higher oil prices and contempt from the nations that will suffer from those higher prices. A military stalemate, similar to what we see in Ukraine, is also a possibility.
The U.S. does not have an apparent advantageous BATNA, so the Iranians are likely to bet that they can stall hoping that the U.S. BATNA will deteriorate. It has been said that the Iranians merely need to survive, while the U.S. must force Iran to capitulate. The Iranian regime’s perceived BATNA is better than capitulation, so they have little incentive to enter into a negotiated agreement that is currently acceptable to the United States.
Consequently, any agreement that is reached is likely to be nothing more than an agreement to continue negotiations. This creates the illusion of progress, without much changing.
I sincerely hope that my analysis is wrong and that the U.S. will be able to negotiate a peace agreement that is worth what it cost, but as time passes, I fear that is increasingly unlikely.
Jim de Bree is a Valencia resident.
